• 'A Sense of Reality: Foreword to the Princeton Classics edition of Bernard Williams' Truth and   Truthfulness (2025)
• ‘Strange credibility: ‘avowal’ as functionally factive testimony’, Jurisprudence: An International J   Journal of Legal and Political Thought (2025), 1-17 (open access)
• ‘A Project of “Impure” Enquiry: Williams’ Historical Self-Consciousness’, Marks Sacks Lecture (2024) European Journal of Philosophy 32: 301-320;

        reprinted in van Ackeren & Queloz eds. Bernard Williams on History and Philosophy (forthcoming OUP)

• ‘Diagnosing Institutionalized Distrustworthiness’ (2023) Philosophical Quarterly 73(3): 722-742

           Special Issue in honour of Katherine Hawley

• ‘Institutionalized Testimonial Injustices’ (2023) Journal of Dialectics of Nature 45(7): 1-12            Special Issue on Epistemic Injustice ed. Huiren Bai
• How Is Forgiveness Always A Gift?' Presidential Address, Proceedings and Addresses of the   American Philosophical Association (forthcoming, 2022)
• ​​‘Institutional Vices: The Case of Inferential Inertia', In Ian J. Kidd, Heather Battaly, Quassim Cassam      (eds.), Epistemic Vice (2021, Routledge)
• ‘Bernard Williams as a Philosopher of Ethical Freedom’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8): 919-    933 (2020); and forthcoming in András Szigeti and Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency:     Themes from Bernard Williams (OUP).
• ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism’, Australasian Philosophical Review 3/3 (2019) (‘target article’       with commentaries by Lucy Allais, Glen Pettigrove, Luke Russell)
• ‘Ambivalence About Forgiveness’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 84 (Nov. 2018)
• ‘Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice’, Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, eds. Ian   James Kidd, José Medina, & Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2017)
• ‘Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experiences’, co-authored with Katharine   Jenkins, Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, eds. Garry, Khader, & Stone (2017)
• ‘Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance’, The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance   eds. M. Blaauw & R. Peels (Cambridge University Press, 2016)
• ‘Fault and No-fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice—A Space for Epistemic Agent-regret', in   Brady & Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives   (Oxford University Press, 2016)
• ‘Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability’, in The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in   Theory and Practice ed. George Hull (Lexington Books 2015)
• ‘What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation’, Noûs 50 (1) 165-183; (2014)
• ‘Styles of Moral Relativism – A Critical Family Tree’, Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed.   Roger Crisp (OUP, 2013)
• ‘Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom’, Synthese 190(7) (2013): 1317-  1332
• ‘Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant’, Philosophy and Phenomenological   Research (84) 2 (2012); 249-276
• ‘Silence and Institutional Prejudice’, Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to   Traditional Philosophy, eds. Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (OUP, 2012);  re-printed, translated   into German, in Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies: Peripherie und Zentrum im Feld   der Theorie eds. Kley, Landweer, Newmark, and Miller (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012)
• ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian   Society Supp. Vol. LXXXIV (2010), 151-77
• ‘Can There Be Institutional Virtues?’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Special Theme: Social   Epistemology) Vol. 3 (2010) eds. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne; 235-252
• ‘The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time’, Epistemology, Royal Institute of Philosophy   Supplement 64, Vol. 84 (2009); 1-18; reprinted and translated into Spanish in Margarita Valdés and   Miguel Àngel Fernàndez (eds.), Valores Epistémicos (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,   2010)
• ‘Scepticism and The Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time’, Philosophical   Papers, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2008); re-printed in Haddock, Millar & Pritchard (eds.) Social   Epistemology (OUP, 2010)
• ‘Powerlessness and Social Interpretation’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3(1-2) (2006);   96-108
• ‘Epistemic Injustice and A Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing’, Metaphilosophy 34(1/2) 2003;   reprinted in M. Brady and D. Pritchard eds.  Moral and Epistemic Virtues  (Blackwell, 2003)
• ‘Life-Story in Beauvoir’s Memoirs’, The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir ed. Claudia   Card (CUP, 2003)
• ‘Confidence and Irony’, Morality, Reflection, and Ideology ed. Edward Harcourt (OUP, 2000)
• ‘Pluralism Without Postmodernism’, The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy eds. M.   Fricker and J. Hornsby (CUP, 2000); reprinted in Gender (four volume set, ‘Major Works’) ed. M. Evans   (Routledge, 2010)
• ‘Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary   Volume 25, Civilization and Oppression, ed. Catherine Wilson, 1999
• ‘Rational Authority and Social Power—Towards a Truly Social Epistemology’, Proceedings of the   Aristotelian Society, Vol. XCVIII Pt.2, 1998; reprinted in Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb eds. Social   Epistemology: An Anthology (OUP, 2010)
• ‘Intuition and Reason’, The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.45 No.179, April 1995