









## Conclusion



I have painted a picture of two kinds of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and two virtues that are such as to prevent or mitigate these injustices respectively: testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice. And I have argued that these virtues are hybrid virtues in that they can function as either intellectual virtues or ethical virtues or both. In the Introduction I suggested that a useful response to the demise of postmodernism is to develop new ways of discussing the ethics of power in our lives as knowers. This is one way of thinking about the contribution I have tried to make in elaborating the notions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. More importantly, by elaborating them in the idiom of virtue epistemology, I hope to have shown how theoretical work of a socially situated tenor can connect up with a historically rich and newly burgeoning philosophical approach to matters of value and knowledge, and I hope in particular to have shown that the virtue epistemological framework provides for an attractive non-inferentialist position in the epistemology of testimony. What has at any rate been explored here is an area of the first-order ethics of epistemic practice. I think the very idea that there *is* a first-order ethics of epistemic practice indicates one viable way in which our philosophical discussions of what it takes to be a knower could come more properly to reflect the fact that the human condition is, necessarily, a socially situated condition.




Part of the point of identifying virtues of epistemic justice on the part of hearers is to clarify and amplify our philosophical conception of what constitutes good epistemic conduct in the socially situated context. But, by implication, it is also to lay a foundation for a conception of correlative institutional virtues—virtues possessed, for instance, by the judiciary, the police, local government, and employers. Combating epistemic injustice clearly calls for virtues of epistemic justice to be possessed by institutions as well as by individuals. It would be nice to think that the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutical justice as I have constructed them might be more or less fit for purpose not only at







the level of the individual but also at the level of the institutional. In exploring epistemic injustice as an ethical phenomenon, therefore, this book also points to the possibility of a different sort of treatment, one more directly concerned with institutional conduct, and so placed more squarely in the political frame. As I said at the outset, however, in terms of our philosophical understanding of epistemic injustice, the ethical is primary, and that, accordingly, has been my focus.


By exploring different forms of epistemic injustice, and by adopting the socially situated conception of epistemic subjects that is needed for such an exploration, we come to see that there is such a thing as epistemic justice, and that a philosophical framework that prescind from matters of social identity and power could never give an account of it. I believe that the only way to fully understand the normative demands made on us in epistemic life is by changing the philosophical gaze so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. That is what I have aimed to do in this book.








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
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


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
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


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


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




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