

Epistemic Virtues and Vices [B&C] Spring 2021 Wednesday 11.45—1.45 on Zoom
Miranda Fricker -- Office Zoom Hours: please email me any time to fix a time to talk ☺

Learning Goals

Students will: gain a solid grounding in key topics in virtue and vice epistemology covered week by week; further develop key professional skills such as those of clear oral presentation, including how to compose a good handout or slides on Zoom; further cultivate skills of philosophical discussion (listening well, criticizing constructively, explaining arguments clearly, articulating different points of view or opposing arguments, judicious use of the raise hand/finger rule); cultivate counterpoised virtues of intellectual courage, humility, rigor, honesty, generosity, and imagination; further develop the ability to plan and execute a well-structured philosophical essay; think carefully, critically, and creatively together—all in an online environment.

Requirements and Assessment:

(i) Come to class having carefully read at least the asterisked readings, having made notes on them so that you can *participate actively* in class—raise questions, confusions, and objections, take turns to speak, and generally help each other understand the philosophical issues raised.

(ii) Please have these readings and your notes in front of you so we can refer back to the texts in our discussions.

(iii) Each registered student must do one or more 10-minute presentations on a reading. Anyone auditing is encouraged to do the same.

(iv) For credit:

Write a 1-2 page plan (mainly bullet points) for your term paper, including bibliography, and email it to me before **DEADLINE midnight Friday April 16** so we can fix a **20-30-minute one-to-one discussion** of it to help ensure you have a good basis for your term paper, due **three weeks later**. If you can do the plan earlier, so much the better. You are *not* graded on your plan—the sole purpose is to ‘scaffold’ your essay to help you write the best paper you can.

(v) For credit:

Write a **Term paper 5000-5500 max words** (incl. any notes, but excl. bibliography, which should be (Name, Date) style with the complete list of references at the end). Please keep footnotes to an absolute minimum. Do NOT exceed the word limit or you may be marked down.

DEADLINE: email the finished paper to me before **midnight Friday May 7 (a few days before our final class)**. Or if you manage earlier, so much the better ☺

Your grade is determined solely by your term paper itself (for guidance see ‘Tips for planning & writing your term paper’ in dropbox). I exercise judgement to appropriately relativize grades to expected levels for MA or PhD programs.

All readings, week by week, and Syllabus are in our shared dropbox

Feb 3

1. Virtue of Intellectual Humility

*Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and D. Howard-Snyder (2017) 'Intellectual Humility: Owing Our Limitations' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XCIV/3

*Robert C. Roberts and Jay W. Wood (2003) 'Humility and Epistemic Goods' in *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, eds. Michael DePaul and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Oxford): 257-79

Alessandra Tanesini (2016) 'Intellectual Humility as an Attitude', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 96 (2): 399-420

J. L. A. Garcia (2006) 'Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility' *Philosophia* 34(4): 417- J 35

Feb 10

2. The Structure of Epistemic Virtues

*Julia Annas (2003) 'The Structure of Virtue' in DePaul and Zagzebski eds. *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology* (Oxford)

*Jason Baehr (2011) 'A Personal Worth Conception of Intellectual Virtue' (ch. 6) of *The Inquiring Mind* (88-111)

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski 1996 'The two components of intellectual virtues' (ch. 4: 165-210) from *Virtues of the Mind* (OUP)

Cameron Boulton, Christoph Kelp, Johanna Schnurr, Mona Simion (2020) 'Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content' in John Greco (ed.) *Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches* (CUP)

Julia Driver (2003) 'The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue' in *Moral and Epistemic Virtues*, ed. M. Brady and D. Pritchard (Blackwell)

Feb 17

3. Knowledge As A Product of Epistemic Skill ('virtue/faculty reliabilism')

*Ernest Sosa (2007) Lecture 2 'A Virtue Epistemology' in *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge* Vol I (OUP)

*John Greco (2003) 'Knowledge As Credit For True Belief' in DePaul and Zagzebski (eds.) *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*

John Greco (2009) 'Knowledge and Success From Ability' *Philosophical Studies*, 142(1): 17–26
[reworked as ch.1 in *Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity* (2010, CUP)]

Duncan Pritchard (2009) 'Apt Performance and Epistemic Value' *Philosophical Studies* 143(3): 407-416

Feb 24

4. Criticizing virtue reliabilist views

*Jennifer Lackey (2009) 'Knowledge and Credit' *Philosophical Studies* 142: 27-42

*Jason Baehr (2011) 'Virtue and Character in Reliabilism' ch. 4 in *The Inquiring Mind*

John Greco (2010) 'The problem of easy knowledge' ch. 11 in *Achieving Knowledge*
[responding to Lackey]

Ernest Sosa (2015) 'Virtue epistemology: Character versus competence' ch.2 of *Judgment and Agency* (OUP) [responding to Baehr]

March 3

5. Knowledge As a Product of Good Epistemic Motive ('virtue responsibilism')

*Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (1996) 'Defining Knowledge', Section 2 of Part III The nature of knowledge, *Virtues of the Mind*: pp. 264-83

*Jason Baehr (2011) 'Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue' ch. 3 in *The Inquiring Mind*
[this is a substantial re-working of his 2006 paper 'Character in epistemology' *Philosophical Studies* 128: 479-514; it critiques Zagzebski]

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (2014) 'Knowledge and the Motive for Truth' in M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Wiley) 140-145

Book Symposium on Zagzebski's *Virtues of the Mind*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2000) 60(1). Précis by Zagzebski and short review articles by John Greco; William P. Alston; Jonathan Kvanvig; Hilary Kornblith; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty; and responses from Zagzebski.

March 10

6. Virtue of Open-Mindedness

*Wayne Riggs (2010) 'Open-mindedness' *Metaphilosophy* 41 (1-2):172-188

*Jason Baehr (2011) 'The Structure of Open-mindedness' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* [also developed as ch.8 in his book *The Inquiring Mind*]

Adam J. Carter and Emma C. Gordon (2014) 'Openmindedness and Truth' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 44(2): 207-224

Jonathan Adler (2004) 'Reconciling Open-mindedness and Belief' *Theory and Research in Education* 2: 127-42

March 17

7. The Structure of Epistemic Vices

*Quassim Cassam (2016) 'Vice Epistemology' *The Monist* 99: 159-180
--See also his 2019 book, *Vices of the Mind*

*Alessandra Tanesini (2018) 'Epistemic Vice and Motivation' *Metaphilosophy* 49(3): 350-67
[developed into ch.2 of her forthcoming *The Mismeasure of the Self*]

Charlie Crerar (2017) 'Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96(4): 753-766

Heather Battaly (2014) 'Varieties of Epistemic Vice' in J. Matheson & R. Vitz (eds.) *The Ethics of Belief* (OUP)

--see also helpful overviews by Baehr and Cassam in *Vice Epistemology* collection, Kidd, Cassam, & Battaly (eds.)

March 24

8. Epistemic Blame

*Jessica Brown (2020) 'What is epistemic blame?' *Noûs*, 54, 389-407

*Cameron Boult (forthcoming) 'There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

Trent Dougherty (2012) 'Reducing responsibility: an evidentialist account of epistemic blame' *European Journal of Philosophy*, 20: 534-547

Miranda Fricker 'Fault and No-fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice—A Space for Epistemic Agent-regret', in Brady & Fricker ed. *The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives* (Oxford University Press, 2016)

[Spring recess over March 31 – NO CLASS]

April 7

9. Character traits and the Situationist challenge—from ethics to epistemology

*John Doris (1998) 'Persons, situations, and virtue ethics' *Nous* 32(4): 504-530
[his 2002 book is *Lack of Character* (CUP)]

*Mark Alfano (2012) 'Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 62 (247): 223-249
[his 2015 book *Character as Moral Fiction* CUP]

Duncan Pritchard (2014) 'Re-evaluating the epistemic situationist challenge to virtue epistemology' in Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.) *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue* (CUP): 143-154

Gilbert Harman (1999) 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (99): 315-331 [this is the paper that kicked off the situationist challenge in philosophy]

April 14

10. Vices and Corrective Virtues of Testimonial Injustice

*Miranda Fricker (2007) *Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing* (OUP)
chs. 1, 2, 4 [– don't worry, this is too much to read, so I'll present it]

*José Medina (2013) 'Resistance as Epistemic Vice and as Epistemic Virtue' ch. 2 in his
*Epistemologies of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant
Imaginations* (OUP)

Alex Madva (2019) 'The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue' *Overcoming Epistemic Injustice:
Social and Psychological Perspectives* Stacey Goguen and Benjamin Sherman eds. (Rowman &
Littlefield): 85-100

Benjamin R. Sherman (2016) 'There's no (testimonial) justice: why pursuit of a virtue is not the
solution to epistemic injustice' *Social Epistemology* 30(30): 229-250

DEADLINE FOR TERM PAPER PLANS: midnight FRIDAY APRIL 16

April 21

11. Vices of Closed-Mindedness and Ignorance

* Heather Battaly (forthcoming) 'Closed-mindedness as an Intellectual Vice' forthcoming in
Christoph Kelp and John Greco (eds.) *Virtue Theoretic Epistemology* (CUP)

* José Medina (2013) 'Epistemic Responsibility and Culpable Ignorance' ch. 4 of *The
Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant
Imaginations* (OUP)

Alessandra Tanesini (2021) 'Ignorance, Arrogance, and Privilege' in I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly, & Q.
Cassam eds. *Vice Epistemology* (Routledge)

Charles Mills (2007) 'White Ignorance' in S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (eds.) *Race and
Epistemologies of Ignorance* (SUNY): 13-38 [does not conceive the issue specifically in terms of
vice/virtue theory, but inspiring others who do]

April 28

12. Institutional Epistemic Virtues

*Emily Sullivan and Mark Alfano (2019) 'Negative Epistemic Exemplars' ch. 1 in Benjamin R.
Sherman and Stacey Goguen (eds.) *Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological
Perspectives* (Rowman & Littlefield)

*Miranda Fricker (2010) 'Can There Be Institutional Virtues?' *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* Vol. 3 eds. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne: 235-252

Elizabeth Anderson (2012) 'Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions', *Social Epistemology* Special Issue on Epistemic Injustice 26(2): 163-173

Miranda Fricker (2013) 'Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom', *Synthese* 190(7): 1317–1332

May 5

13. Institutional Epistemic Vices

*Jennifer Lackey (2020) 'False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice' 110 (1): 43-68

*José Medina (2021) 'Capital vices, institutional failures, and epistemic neglect in a county jail' in I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly & Q. Cassam eds. *Vice Epistemology* (Routledge)

Andrea J. Pitts (2019) 'Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition: Trust and Truth-Telling in Correctional healthcare' ch. 13 in Benjamin R. Sherman and Stacey Goguen (eds.) *Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives*

Miranda Fricker (2021) 'Institutional Vices: The Case of Inferential Inertia' in Ian J. Kidd, Heather Battaly, Quassim Cassam (eds.) *Epistemic Vice*

DEADLINE FOR TERM PAPERS: midnight FRIDAY MAY 7

May 12

14. Epistemic Bubbles and Conspiracy Theories

*C. Thi Nguyen (2018) 'Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles' *Episteme* (17) 2:1–21

*David Coady (2007) 'Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?' *Episteme* 4/2: 193-204

Emily Sullivan and Mark Alfano (2021) 'Vectors of epistemic insecurity' in I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly, & Q. Cassam eds. *Vice Epistemology* (Routledge): 148-64

Quassim Cassam (2019) *Conspiracy Theories* (Cambridge: Polity Press)

Have a great summer!